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I. INTRODUCTION
―[M]orality [i]s essential to the well-being of society
and . . . encouragement of religion [i]s the best way to foster
morality.‖
Justice Antonin Scalia1

Religious accommodation doctrine is ripe for another round at the
Supreme Court. Not since several landmark rulings in the 1970s and 1980s
has the Court reviewed the Title VII statutory mandate that employers must
accommodate religion in the workplace.2 Meanwhile, with the Court‘s
personnel changes since then, the Court‘s Establishment Clause jurisprudence
has shifted significantly toward accommodating more religion in the public
sphere (e.g., religious displays on government property and public funding of
religious activities). Thus, when the religious accommodation law is
reviewed by the Court again, in order for the Court‘s Title VII workplace
jurisprudence to be consistent with its shift toward supporting religious
expression, the Court is likely to support more protection for religious
workers.
Analogizing workers‘ statutory religious rights to fundamental
constitutional rights makes sense for two reasons. First, religion is given
special protection under a variety of constitutional and statutory doctrines and
is especially important to the current majority of Justices. Second, a person‘s
religious identity, although mutable, is a fundamental personal decision on par
with recognized fundamental rights such as marriage and procreation.
Religion matters to people. It matters a great deal to religious observers
who wish to be free from discrimination and who believe the law should
protect them from harassment and discrimination when they express
themselves. This is especially and most frequently true for observers of
minority religions.3 It matters to those who do not ascribe to any religion
1. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 887 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
the Framers of the United States Constitution).
2. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986).
3. In evaluating the rights of religious observers, it is important to note that discrimination and
harassment of observers of minority religions most forcefully underscores the importance of legal
protection. See, e.g., Bilal Zaheer, Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How
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because they want to be assured that religion is not encroaching on their right
to a religious-neutral government and to live a life free from unwanted
harassment or bias. This tension plays out most forcefully in two places in
American society: the public sphere and the workplace. The public sphere is
the forum where communities gather and express certain (often majority but
also sometimes controversial) viewpoints. Yet the workplace is where most
people spend most of their waking time and therefore bump up against others
of different views most frequently.
Read at face value, the Free Exercise Clause protects religious expression
against governmental power, while the Establishment Clause bars government
from adopting a religion itself. In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized in
First Amendment case law that the Constitution does not work to ―constrain a
worker to abandon his religious convictions‖ in the workplace.4 In the private
sector, Title VII has been explicitly amended to broaden protections for
religious expression.5 In stark contrast to its First Amendment jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court has given Title VII‘s protection the most narrow of
interpretations, requiring employers to show only a de minimis burden6 to
successfully avoid being required to accommodate religious workers. In
response, members of Congress have repeatedly tried to strengthen those
protections through various iterations of the Workplace Religious Freedom
Act. 7
In the public sphere, courts allow many flowers to bloom. Nativity scenes
next to menorahs,8 as well as Ten Commandments displays with historical
(rather than exclusively religious) significance are allowed to flourish in the
Muslims Make the Case for a New Interpretation of Section 701(J), 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 500
(emphasizing the unique problems that Islam, with its practice-intensive nature, presents for both
employers and employees in trying to provide equitable accommodations to religious minorities in
the workplace).
4. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000)).
6. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
7. The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005, H.R. 1445, 109th Cong. (2005), S. 677,
109th Cong. (2005), aims ―to amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to establish provisions
with respect to religious accommodation in employment, and for other purposes.‖ See generally
James A. Sonne, The Perils of Universal Accommodation: The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of
2003 and the Affirmative Action of 147,096,000 Souls, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2004)
(discussing widespread support for previous efforts to pass prior proposal for WRFA).
8. E.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (ruling
that the state did not violate the Establishment Clause by permitting a private party to display an
unattended cross on the grounds of the state capitol); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (holding that a Chanukah menorah display next to a
Christmas tree outside a city-county governmental building did not violate the Establishment
Clause); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding a city‘s inclusion of a nativity scene
in its Christmas display did not violate the Establishment Clause).
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public domain.9 However, in the workplace, the Supreme Court has allowed
employers to restrict religious expression. 10 Legislative efforts to protect
religious expression have been stymied by judicial refusal to protect such
expression meaningfully.11 This stems from courts‘ predisposition toward
viewing ―accommodation‖ as an entirely different concept than
―nondiscrimination,‖ viewing the former far more skeptically than the latter.
When faced with challenges by both religious observers and secularists,
the Supreme Court treats the public sphere and the workplace very differently.
What is striking is that the newly powerful conservative bloc of Justices
(namely Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito) likely will be quick to support
religious expression in the public sphere cases, such as McCreary County v.
ACLU of Kentucky,12 yet they have joined a Court with a tradition of refusing
to grant the same rights to observant workers. 13 This Article explores whether
the new Court will overturn its Title VII precedents to grant the same
expansive religious rights in the workplace that it increasingly has granted in
the public sphere.
This Article makes the case for judicial recognition of respectful religious
expression in the workplace as more consistent with the Court‘s
9. E.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690–92 (2005) (ruling a Ten Commandments
display on the grounds of the state capitol was constitutional when the display had an undeniable
historical meaning). But see McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 871–72 (2005)
(holding displays of the Ten Commandments at courthouses violated the Establishment Clause when
the counties‘ purpose was to emphasize a religious message).
10. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986) (noting that an
employer is not required to bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating an employee‘s
religious beliefs); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985) (ruling a state
statute that provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their
Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause); Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 84 (holding an
employer is not required to bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating an employee‘s
religious beliefs); see also Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 321 (1997) (―[In] claims that
employers have failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiffs‘ religion by refusing to permit them
to observe religious holy days or to dress or groom in a particular way . . . plaintiffs lose most of the
time. Indeed, the law seems so settled . . . that the claims are rarely, if ever, brought any more.‖).
11. See generally Jamie Darin Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A Hobson’s Choice Model
For Religious Accommodation, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 467 (2006) (discussing how Title VII‘s religious
accommodation mandate is often ineffective).
12. 545 U.S. at 885–912 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); id. at 692–98 (Thomas, J., concurring); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726–33
(2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687, 732–52 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631–46 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Reg‘l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1489–97 (3d. Cir. 1996)
(Mansmann, J., dissenting, joined by Alito, J.); Brief for the United States, Bd. of Educ. of the
Westside Cmty. Sch. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (No. 88-1597), 1989 WL 1127408
(co-authored by Roberts) (arguing to the Court that religious groups should not be banned from
meeting on school grounds).
13. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 479 U.S. at 69.
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence and also more true to the legislative intent
of the religious accommodation provisions of Title VII. Respectful religious
pluralism in the workplace should become the norm through judicial
requirements of best practices in the workplace. Such a view should be
wholly supported by the majority of the Justices because it is consistent with
their expressed views, in the Establishment Clause case law, that religion
fosters moral good and that in a pluralistic society religious expression cannot
automatically be deemed threatening to those with different views.
This Article examines in Part II how religious observance is an intrinsic
and undeniable part of many people‘s identities, and it argues that refusing to
acknowledge observers as religious people and refusing to allow them to
express themselves as such is similar to keeping gays and lesbians in the
closet. From that viewpoint, allowing religious expression is not an
adventurous ―accommodation‖ asking for different or ―special‖ rights.
Next, in Part III, an examination of the Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence on
the public sphere and religion cases showcases the judicial trend of not only
allowing, but also promoting certain religious expression in our society.
Part IV details the refusal of courts to protect workers who express
themselves religiously in the workplace, even though such protection is
mandated by Title VII and consistent with the Court‘s public sphere
Establishment Clause doctrine.
Lastly, Part V attempts to solve this inconsistency by creating a path for
the Supreme Court to follow: interpret Title VII‘s religious accommodation
mandates in alignment with its Establishment Clause jurisprudence and with
express congressional intent, an intent that is echoed in pending legislation
that would expand protections for workers who express themselves in
religious ways.14 Specifically, I propose three paths of judicial enforcement
of respectful pluralism, which protect both religious expression and secularist
workers from disrespectful expression.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
People express themselves in a multitude of ways: by dress, 15 with
adornments, by surrounding themselves with objects, and through discussion
with others. In this way, expression is not just verbal but occurs in myriad
nonverbal associations, as the Court has noted in protecting ―symbolic

14. The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007).
15. See generally Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of
Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 13 (2006)
(proposing a legal right to free dress); Dean B. Ziegel, Note, The Prohibition of Religious
Observances in the Workplace, 5 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 197, 197–98 (1988) (discussing religious dress
in the armed forces).
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speech‖ and ―expressive conduct‖ that is nonverbal and nonwritten.16 What
we choose to wear, what we do to our skin and hair, what adornments we
decide to put on—these are all expressions that reflect particular intrinsic
characteristics of core parts of ourselves that are normally not meaningfully
filtered. Instead, these expressions reflect who people are, what they believe,
and in what category they hold their beliefs.
Religious expressions in particular can communicate many deeply held
views. What people wear (such as a head scarf or prayer beads), what and
whether they choose to eat (including strict dietary guidelines such as no pork
or no meat on certain days or abstaining from all meals for certain periods), 17
and what holidays they find important (such as Rosh Hashanah, Eid al-Adha,
or Good Friday) are expressions communicating both religious identity and
the level of commitment that person holds. In many instances, these
expressions cannot be changed, at least not without altering the core of one‘s
identity.
As members of particular societies, in order to assimilate, we learn to
filter some individual expression to various degrees. This is especially true in
the workplace, in keeping with particular norms of business or professions, as
well as the public forum, where we want to ―fit in‖ with our community
members. However, certain intrinsic characteristics express themselves
without much alteration, either because they are unalterable to the person or
because they are too important to try to hide or change. Said another way,
people feel they should not have to alter who they are by pretending to be
something they are not—i.e., ―passing,‖ ―covering,‖ or ―closeting‖ their true
identities.18 This is because religious identity (and consequently its
expression) is an integrated part of one‘s self. Although conversion happens
and new faith beliefs evolve, many people‘s religion is set at a very early age
and is an authentic expression of their world view. 19 Much like it is difficult
for the majority racial group to understand the primary importance of racial

16. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991) (regarding dancing); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402 (1989) (regarding flag burning); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–07 (1969) (regarding wearing black armbands).
17. In Islam, observant Muslims are required to fast for one month out of the year during
Ramadan (known as Sawm).
18. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 811–45 (2002) (discussing harm
experienced by members of the gay and lesbian community as a result of having to mask their sexual
orientation).
19. See Ross M. Stolzenberg et al., Religious Participation in Early Adulthood: Age and
Family Life Cycle Effects on Church Membership, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 84, 98 (1995); Neela Banerjee,
A Fluid Religious Life is Seen Among Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2008, at A12 (reporting that
while religion is fluid and highly diverse in America, it remains ―the single most important factor that
drives American belief attitudes and behaviors‖ (quoting Michael Lindsay, Assistant Director of the
Center on Race, Religion and Urban Life at Rice University)).
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identity to a person in a minority race group, secularists often do not
understand the commitment a religious observer has to her own religious
identity.
Asking religious observers to suppress or deny their religious identity can
be likened to the closeting of certain sexual orientations. Beyond the ―nature
or nurture‖ debate, it has been well established that being gay or straight is
part of one‘s intrinsic being. 20 In situations of extreme societal pressures and
intolerance, some GLBT members of society ―closet‖ themselves by refusing
to communicate their sexual orientation to others. Similarly, in many
professional and educational sectors and culturally elite settings, expressing
one‘s religious identity is likewise disfavored. Both should be antithetical to a
tolerant society. Yet, we should be just as uncomfortable requiring religious
observers to hide their expression21 because while a person‘s sexual
orientation rarely requires particular dress, eating, or other observances,
religious observers‘ expressions of those things are mandatory to orthodox or
fundamentalist followers. While closets should be unnecessary in either case,
tolerant society members should be compelled to protect those who are put to
an untenable choice between following their faith and avoiding backlash from
secularists.22
Europe has seen significant recent examples of crackdowns on religious
expression fundamental to people‘s identities.
Recently, the French
Parliament adopted a law that forbids teachers and students at public schools
to wear ostentatious religious signs and apparel. 23 In Germany, the German
Federal Constitutional Court made a controversial decision in its ―head scarf
decision‖ of 2003, when a teacher intending to wear a Muslim head scarf
during school was rejected by the government of the State BadenWurttemberg. 24 Public outcry sparked global discussions about religious
pluralism and the relationship between state and religion.
As the world‘s population becomes more transient and integrated, and
diverse cultural identities collide, respect for religious pluralism takes on
greater importance. In the early United States, religious diversity was
20. See, e.g., JANIS S. BOHAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION : COMING TO TERMS
88 (1996); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1994).
21. As one commentator eloquently asked, ―Why should an employee be forced to surrender
his or her right to communicate with coworkers who share a similar cultural world view in the
language of that culture, at least where no immediate danger to person or property is at stake?‖ BILL
PIATT, LANGUAGE ON THE JOB: BALANCING BUSINESS NEEDS AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 125 (1993).
22. Prenkert & Magid, supra note 11, at 468.
23. Law No. 2004-228, Article L. 141-5-1, of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190.
24. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [federal constitutional court] Sept. 24, 2003, 2
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1436 (F.R.G).
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minimal compared to today, given the country‘s Christian roots. But during
the last century or so, the influx of immigrants bringing many different
religions has made this topic more critical. Today, it should come as no
surprise that many of the world‘s religions are being practiced in America. 25
But where are they being practiced? Privately, but also in the public sphere
and in workplaces—and, as Parts III and IV document, the courts treat the
public sphere and the workplace strikingly differently when it comes to
religious expression.
III. THE SUPREME COURT‘S SHIFT TO STRONG SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS
EXPRESSION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
Protecting religious expression and prohibiting the state from mandating
any one particular religion to the exclusion of others are fundamental
foundations of the Constitution‘s Bill of Rights. The Free Exercise Clause
promotes religious expression by prohibiting any intentional burden on its
practice.26 Conversely, the Establishment Clause ―protects religious liberty
and autonomy, including the protection of taxpayers from being forced to
support religious ideologies to which they are opposed.‖27
Conservative jurists point out that the Framers intentionally carved out
protections for religion because of the important place religion holds in
American life. 28 As George Washington noted in his Farewell Address, ―[o]f
all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and
morality are indispensable supports.‖29 This sentiment remains alive today in
the hearts of many jurists and increasingly so in the Court‘s religion
jurisprudence.
A. The Supreme Court’s Longstanding Acknowledgment of the Important
Role Religion Plays in Society
In religious display cases, the Supreme Court has often pledged its support
for the role religion plays in American society. In 1952, Justice Douglas
25. BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., THE GRADUATE CENTER OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW
YORK,
AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS
IDENTIFICATION
SURVEY
2001,
available
at
http://www.trincoll.edu/NR/rdonlyres/AFCEF53A-8DAB-4CD9-A8925453E336D35D/0/NEWARISrevised121901b.pdf.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 9, 37 (2004).
28. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 887 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (―Those who wrote the Constitution believed that morality was essential to the well-being
of society and that encouragement of religion was the best way to foster morality.‖).
29. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789–1897, at 213, 220 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1896).
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wrote that ―[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We
make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of
man deem necessary.‖30
Ten years later, the Court declared (in grandiose fashion) that ―[t]he
history of man is inseparable from the history of religion.‖ 31 And in 1984,
Chief Justice Burger wrote that ―[t]here is an unbroken history of official
acknowledgement by all three branches of government of the role of religion
in American life from at least 1789.‖32
In other religious expression contexts, the Court has also shown its
willingness to support a broad role for religion in society. In 1983, the Court
addressed prayer in government proceedings by first acknowledging:
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more
than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of
opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of
the fabric of our society. To invoke Divine guidance on a
public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these
circumstances, an ―establishment‖ of religion or a step toward
establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgement of
beliefs widely held among the people of this country. 33
In First Amendment jurisprudence, religious holiday observers have fared
well in the Supreme Court, as witnessed in the seminal case of Sherbert v.
Verner, in which the Court recognized that an employer cannot deny
employment benefits to an applicant who refused to accept work on her
Sabbath because such denial violated the Free Exercise Clause. 34 Instead, the
Court requires that laws do not ―constrain a worker to abandon his religious
convictions‖ in the workplace. 35
B. The Supreme Court Has Strengthened Protection of Religious Expression
in the Public Sphere
In Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court grapples with how much
religion government can support or participate in. During most of the midtwentieth century, the prevailing view was to bar most government religious

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962).
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984).
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 410.
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expression, such as voluntary school prayer 36 and financial support for
activities that in any way related to religion, such as state aid to religious
schools for secular subjects.37 As was made clear in the seminal case of
Lemon v. Kurtzman,38 the Court placed a high burden on this uneasy
relationship, requiring that in order for a government activity to pass
constitutional muster, the government must prove the following: ―First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster ‗an excessive government entanglement with
religion.‘‖39
The tide in this area began to turn in the late 1980s, when the Court began
to permit more religion in the public sphere. 40 The Court allowed some
religious holiday displays on public property, 41 more public funds for
religious student organizations 42 and parochial schools, 43 and more access to
religious groups in public facilities,44 including public universities. 45
This increasing permission granted by the Court between government and
religion has recently become more pronounced by returning to the religious
clauses‘ historical roots and encouraging religion for the betterment of
society. At the tail end of a flurry of cases involving religious artifact
displays in the circuit courts,46 in 2005, the Supreme Court issued two
surprising decisions on the posting of the Ten Commandments on public
property. 47 Ten separate opinions were issued in the two cases, reflecting the
36. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424.
37. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
38. Id. at 612.
39. Id. at 612–13 (internal citations omitted).
40. For a comprehensive address on this subject, see Scott A. Moss, Where There’s At-Will,
There Are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing Incoherence of Employment At Will, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 295, 336–41 (2005).
41. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 616 (1989).
42. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (holding that a
public university violated the Free Speech Clause by denying university funding to a student
religious publication).
43. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (allowing public school teachers to be sent to
parochial schools to provide remedial education and expressly overruling the contrary holding of
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)).
44. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981).
45. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837 (holding that the state violated the First Amendment by
refusing to provide funds to a Christian student group that published a religious magazine).
46. See, e.g., Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857, 858–59 (7th Cir. 2005); Mercier v.
Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 695–96 (7th Cir. 2005); Modrovich v. Allegheny County,
385 F.3d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 2004); Freethought Soc. of Greater Philadelphia v. Chester County, 334
F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2003); King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2003).
47. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690–91 (2005) (ruling a Ten Commandments
display on the grounds of the state capitol was constitutional when the display had an undeniable
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Court‘s splintered views on the subject. Given the recent personnel changes
on the Court, taking a close look at the Justices‘ messages on religion is
instructive as to the role they believe religion plays in private and public life.
In Van Orden v. Perry, a Court majority allowed a Ten Commandments
monument to remain on state capitol grounds. 48 In doing so, the plurality
opinion (written by Chief Justice Rehnquist) was explicit in wanting to allow
the state to ―encourage[]‖ religion and ―widen the effective scope of religious
influence‖:
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.
For it then respects the religious nature of our people and
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To
hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference
to religious groups. . . . [W]e find no constitutional
requirement which makes it necessary for government to be
hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to
widen the effective scope of religious influence. 49
Here, the Court analyzes the constitutionality of a religious monument by
evaluating the religious traditions of American history, signifying the
importance they hold. It does so, however, while still acknowledging that
religious freedom itself is endangered when government intervention in
religious matters crosses a certain line.
In the companion case, McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the Court
came to the opposite conclusion. 50 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that
displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse
was improper because the hanging of the religious display was a government
action with a religious purpose, in violation of the Establishment Clause. 51
Justice Breyer, the swing vote in both cases, wrote separately in Van
Orden. In doing so, he took pains to reach out to religious observers, stating
that ―to reach a contrary conclusion here . . . would, I fear, lead the law to
exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no place in our Establishment

historical meaning); McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 871–72 (2005) (holding
displays of the Ten Commandments at courthouses violated the Establishment Clause when the
counties‘ purpose was to emphasize a religious message).
48. 545 U.S. at 692.
49. Id. at 684 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952)).
50. 545 U.S. at 850–51.
51. Id. at 870–74.
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Clause traditions.‖52 As the swing vote, Justice Breyer‘s views and his
reconciliation of religion in the hearts of many Americans with our nation‘s
tradition is important. Justice Breyer framed the issue precisely: how to
balance the competing interests without creating hostility toward religion. It
is exactly this elimination of hostility toward religious expression that must be
examined by our courts and by our employers.
With the Court appearing to shift further in the direction of allowing
public religious expression since these two cases (with Justice O‘Connor, who
voted to disallow both Ten Commandments displays, being replaced by
Justice Alito), it is instructional to look at the writings of the Court‘s most
longstanding advocate of more religion in public life, Justice Scalia.
In McCreary, Justice Scalia wrote, in his trademark style, a pointed
dissent for four Justices (Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and in part Kennedy)—
and, with Justice Alito having since joined the Court, Justice Scalia‘s views
may well now command a majority. In his McCreary dissent, Justice Scalia
argued that the majority‘s assertion that the Establishment Clause mandates
neutrality toward religion is not supported by the Constitution, nor is it
consistent with our nation‘s history and tradition. 53 It is disappointing to note
that Justice Scalia‘s dissent in McCreary only goes so far as protecting the
majority religion‘s role in American society (Judeo-Christianity). He fails to
acknowledge the role of minority religions, which as discussed above, play a
crucial role in many Americans‘ lives. 54
Justice Scalia made clear the Framers‘ view that ―morality was essential to
the well-being of society and that encouragement of religion was the best way
to foster morality.‖55 This quote, more than any other, signals the Court‘s
likely journey forward: encourage religion in order to foster morality in our
world.
Ironically, another theme of Justice Scalia‘s dissent is the requirement that
legal principles be applied consistently. 56 Yet as discussed below, it is with
great inconsistency that the Court approaches religion in the workplace, never
expressing the same respect for religion in employment cases that it has in its
public sphere cases. The Ten Commandments cases showcase the Justices‘
struggle to agree on exactly where to draw the line between the need to
52. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring).
53. 545 U.S. at 885–912 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. The failure by Justice Scalia to include minority religions has been noted by other scholars.
See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten
Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2006)
(―In other words, in Justice Scalia‘s opinion, biblical monotheism is now, has always been, and will
always be, the favored religion of the United States Constitution.‖).
55. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 887 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 890–91.
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accommodate religious expression and accommodation that goes too far in the
public sphere. What is striking is that in its employment law cases, the Court
largely fails to protect religion in the workplace to any appreciable degree.
IV. HOW THE COURTS DENY RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE WORKPLACE
A. Congress’s Call: Protect Religious Expression of Employees
Beginning in the Civil Rights era, the United States has endeavored to
eliminate workplace discrimination for workers who might suffer because of
certain characteristics. In 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act made it
unlawful for an employer to ―discriminate against any individual‖ with
respect to employment ―because of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.‖57 In amending the Act in 1972, Congress went further by
requiring employers to provide ―reasonable accommodat[ion]‖ of an
employee‘s religious beliefs unless such accommodation would impose an
―undue hardship‖ on the employer‘s business. 58 Congress took an unusual
step in defining ―religion‖ for purposes of the accommodation mandate (as
―includ[ing] all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as
belief‖)59 but leaving the terms ―reasonable accommodation‖ and ―undue
hardship‖ undefined.
A look into the legislative history suggests that the lawmakers‘ intent was
to protect employees from losing their jobs solely because their religious
beliefs required them to do certain things, such as observe particular holidays,
that the rules of their workplace otherwise might not allow. 60 This
understanding comes from the two cases that Congress included in the
legislative record, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.61 and Riley v. Bendix Corp.62
Both cases stand for the proposition that there is no actionable religious
discrimination so long as employers‘ actions are based on uniformly applied,
religion-neutral rules or working conditions. In Dewey, the plaintiff was
discharged for refusing to work Sundays, and the court‘s holding (which was

57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
58. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000))
(―The term ‗religion‘ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee‘s or
prospective employee‘s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer‘s business.‖).
59. Id.
60. 118 CONG. REC. 705–06 (1972) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph, sponsor and chief
proponent of the 1972 amendments).
61. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
62. 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
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affirmed by the Supreme Court)63 was that the duty to accommodate based
just on Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines was
without statutory basis.64 In Riley, the court expressed doubt that employers
should be forced to accommodate all religious beliefs: ―[S]urely the great and
diversified types of American business cannot be expected to accede to the
wishes of every doctrine or religious belief.‖ 65
The outcomes of both cases were enough of a concern that Congress
included them in the legislative record as specific examples of judicial
reasoning that the accommodation mandate was intended to overturn. 66 The
sponsor of the bill, Senator Jennings Randolph, urged Congress to ―assure that
freedom from religious discrimination in the employment of workers is for all
time guaranteed by law.‖67 The lawmakers hoped that the accommodation
mandate would then save employees from having to choose between their
religious beliefs and their jobs.68 The measure passed overwhelmingly in both
houses.69
The scope and magnitude of this congressional grant of ―positive rights‖ 70
for religious observers is profound, especially when contrasted to the lack of
such protection for other categories, such as race and sex. 71 Arguably there
now exist statutory ―accommodation‖ requirements for sex (such as 1993‘s
Family and Medical Leave Act,72 which was conceived largely as an
accommodation for women with family responsibilities), 73 race (under the
―disparate impact‖ doctrine requiring elimination of even neutrally intended
practices that negatively affect racial minorities, a doctrine the Court
established in 197174 and Congress strengthened in 1991),75 and disability—
but none of these ―accommodation mandates‖76 existed at the time Congress
63. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam).
64. Dewey, 429 F.2d at 334.
65. 330 F. Supp. at 590.
66. 118 CONG. REC. 705–13 (1972).
67. 118 CONG. REC. 705 (statement of Sen. Randolph).
68. Id.
69. See 118 CONG. REC. 731, 7170, 7572–73.
70. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992).
71. For an analysis of the different treatment courts give religion versus sex and race under
Title VII, see generally Engle, supra note 10.
72. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000).
73. See Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728–31 (2003).
74. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
75. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1080 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)).
76. Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 231–32, 277–78 (2000)
(noting how medical leave requirements and disparate impact similarly are ―accommodation
mandates‖).
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legislated the requirement that employers accommodate their employees‘
religions.
The language of the 1972 amendments sought to protect religious
expression and eliminate the prior case law‘s bright-line difference between
religious status (protected) and religious conduct (unprotected). Instead of
just protecting a worker‘s status as a religious observer (as Congress did for
racial minorities and for women), this law goes further to also protect the
conduct associated with such status, such as religious expression and
observance. 77 While the law requires that courts balance the interests of
employers and employees, the statutory language indicates that the balance
should be weighted in favor of employees, given the textual requirement that
accommodation be provided unless it would unduly burden the employer.78
B. The Courts’ Answer: Protect Employer Interests
The Supreme Court was unwilling to consider the expansive nature of the
legislative history in interpreting the reasonable accommodation provision.
Instead, the Court severely limited employers‘ obligations to accommodate
religious employees. In 1977‘s Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the
employee had a religious objection to working on his Sabbath day. 79 The
Court held that an accommodation causes ―undue hardship‖ whenever that
accommodation results in ―more than a de minimis cost‖ to the employer. 80
The only other Supreme Court decision addressing religious accommodation
under Title VII was in 1986: Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook.81 In
Ansonia, the Court rejected an employee‘s claim for religious accommodation
and, in doing so, repudiated the requirement of employers having to reach a
reasonable accommodation. 82
Outside these two opinions, the Court has never addressed religious
accommodation under Title VII, and those two decisions merely address a
facet of religious expression: employee requests for accommodation in work
schedule conflicts. As the EEOC guidelines suggest, other important conflicts
between workplace rules and religious observances exist, such as dress and
grooming requirements, the need for prayer breaks, dietary requirements, and
prohibitions on certain medical procedures. 83
77. Equal Opportunities Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
79. 432 U.S. 63, 67 (1977).
80. Id. at 84. This definition was later reaffirmed by the Court in Ansonia Board of Education
v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986).
81. 479 U.S. at 63.
82. Id. at 74–75 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1605.2(d)(1) (2004).
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Most courts post-Hardison and Ansonia have uncritically embraced the
Court‘s stringent standard of requiring only de minimis accommodations,
effectively stripping the accommodation down to a ―dead letter.‖84 Indeed,
courts routinely take a ―per se‖ approach: ―virtually all cost alternatives have
been declared unduly harsh simply because a loss is involved.‖ 85
Additionally, judges are sympathetic to employers‘ arguments that coemployees would be negatively affected by a proposed accommodation for a
religious employee, finding such arguments a basis for deeming a requested
accommodation to cause the employer undue hardship.86 In such holdings, as
one commentator notes, ―Although the Supreme Court set a reasonable
ceiling, the ceiling appears to have fallen to the floor.‖87
The well-known case of Wilson v. U.S. West Communications highlights
this judicial philosophy when courts attempt to balance the needs of religious
employees and employers‘ business.88 The employee made a religious vow to
express her opposition to abortion and, in keeping with her religious views,
wore a button depicting a photograph of a second-trimester fetus (one that
does not appear to be particularly graphic), 89 with the slogans ―Stop Abortion‖
and ―They‘re Forgetting Someone.‖90 Wilson‘s coworkers opposed her
wearing of the button at work and called it ―disturbing,‖ claiming that the
button amounted to harassment and charging the supervisor with harassment
for failing to stop her from wearing it. 91 The employer offered three
accommodations: (1) Wilson could wear the button in her cubicle; (2) she
could wear the button but cover it while she worked in the office; or (3) she
could wear a different button that did not have a photograph of a fetus on it. 92
When Wilson brought suit, claiming the employer failed to reasonably
accommodate her, the trial court held that Wilson‘s religious beliefs (although
sincerely held) did not require her to engage in this expression and that

84. Prenkert & Magid, supra note 11, at 468.
85. Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer’s Duty to Accommodate Employee Religious
Practices Under Title VII after Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 513,
547 (1989).
86. See, e.g., Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 607 (9th Cir. 2004); Chalmers v.
Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir. 1996); Wilson v. U.S. West Commc‘ns, 58
F.3d 1337, 1341 (8th Cir. 1995).
87. Sonny Franklin Miller, Religious Accommodation Under Title VII: The Burdenless Burden,
22 J. CORP. L. 789, 795 (1997).
88. 58 F.3d at 1338–40.
89. Picture on file with author.
90. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1339.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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requiring Wilson to cover the button while at work was a reasonable
accommodation.93
The Eighth Circuit upheld the trial court‘s ruling. In an opinion reflecting
the court‘s clear indifference toward Wilson‘s religious beliefs, 94 the court
held that it would be unduly burdensome to allow her to wear her button
because of the impact her chosen expression had on her coworkers.95 The
court characterized her requested accommodation as requiring her employer
to ―allow Wilson to impose her beliefs as she chooses.‖ 96 This ―heckler‘s
veto‖97 trumped Wilson‘s position that she was expressing her religious
beliefs and stymied any discussion on what reasonable accommodations did
exist to minimize the impact of her expression.
Trial courts are likewise unsympathetic to religious observers in the
workplace because of the high Hardison undue burden threshold. Federal
district courts routinely reject claims of workers to observe their religion
through their grooming and other observant habits. 98 In one typical case,
Hussein v. Pierre Hotel, the district court rejected the claims of a Muslim
employee to have a beard in accordance with his religious observance by
ruling that it was an undue hardship on the employer because it ―jeopardiz[ed]
[the hotel employer‘s] reputation for elegance and cleanliness.‖ 99 These cases
exemplify the approach taken by courts in reviewing religious
accommodation suits: the balance swings in favor of the employer under the
de minimis standard, and deference is given to any employer‘s concern for
possible offense over religious expression.
But isn‘t Title VII‘s religious accommodation mandate, and even the Free
Exercise Clause, intended to protect these types of religious expressions, even
if unconventional and outside the mainstream? And doesn‘t protection of
religious expression, whether by the Constitution or by Title VII, necessarily
93. Id. at 1340.
94. See Theresa M. Beiner & John M. A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious
Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 577, 602–03 (1997).
95. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1341–42.
96. Id. at 1341.
97. Prenkert & Magid, supra note 11, at 497–98.
98. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sambo‘s of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 90–91 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (rejecting
the claim of a Sikh worker that a uniform grooming policy proscribing facial hair constituted
unlawful discrimination); see also Khan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., No. 02 Civ.8893(JCF), 2005
WL 273027, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2005); Sheikh v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 535, No. Civ. 00 1896DWFSRN, 2001 WL 1636504, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 2001); Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 134
F. Supp. 2d 591, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hussein v. Hotel Employees & Rest. Union, Local 6, 108 F.
Supp. 2d 360, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Gay v. S.U.N.Y Health Sci. Ctr. of Brooklyn, No. 96-CV-5065
(JG), 1998 WL 765190, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 1998); EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788
F. Supp. 1154, 1157–58 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Ali v. S.E. Neighborhood House, 519 F. Supp. 489, 497
(D.D.C. 1981).
99. 99 Civ. 2715, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4859, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2001).
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create a religiously pluralistic society in which each person‘s openly religious
identity could generate disagreement or upset in others? Anti-discrimination
laws are not designed to protect majority views; they are written for protection
of the minority, even if generally unpopular.
Of course, there is a line at which an employee‘s religious expression
crosses over into harassment. In Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., the
employee, in response to diversity posters, posted Biblical scriptures in his
work space, including one that condemned homosexuality. 100 His supervisors
determined that the scripture postings were offensive and violated the
company‘s policy prohibiting workplace harassment. 101 Subsequently, the
employee was fired for insubordination when he refused to remove the
scripture postings.102 In response to the employee‘s claims that his employer
failed to accommodate his religious beliefs, the Ninth Circuit held that it
would create an undue hardship for the employer to accommodate him by
allowing him to post messages intended to demean and harass his
coworkers.103
Both the Wilson and Peterson cases involve balancing the religious
observer‘s right to express his or her religious self and the right of others not
to be demeaned and degraded. In essence, the content of the message matters.
It is an interesting hypothetical to consider what type of anti-abortion button
would cross the line into harassment such that Wilson‘s right to
accommodation would be trumped by the degradation felt by the audience.
What is required is a true balancing test that recognizes the accommodation
requirement but only so far as would not devalue another. In this way, the
doctrine can take its cues from anti-harassment laws in sex discrimination, as
described below in Part V. Such a balancing test is a far cry from the current
doctrine, in which there essentially is no right to religious expression or
practice whenever others object.
Admittedly, it is unlikely that the Court will overtly overturn the Hardison
decision on its own because it was a statutory interpretation by the Court, and
―considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory
construction, where Congress is free to change this Court‘s interpretation of
its legislation.‖104 The Court, however, can broaden the protections afforded
employees without admitting a wholesale abandonment 105 of the de minimis

100. 358 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 2004).
101. Id. at 602.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 607–08.
104. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
105. See, e.g., St. Mary‘s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Tex. Dep‘t of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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standard because that standard is, in essence, a balancing test—just one that,
to date, has been weighted too heavily against employees‘ rights. 106
Because the law protects religious expression and accommodates religious
observers, the presumption should favor the worker, or at least the test should
be one of fair balancing, not a strong presumption that employers and
coworkers need not bear any inconvenience at all. As stated above, the courts
have not followed this mandate. The issue is: How do we draw the line?
V. SOLVING THE INCONSISTENCY: THREE APPROACHES TO PROTECTING
RESPECTFUL RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE WORKPLACE
How should the Court view the newly emerging religious accommodation
right in order to be in line with the principles of tolerance and inclusion
outlined above? Put another way, with religious expression in the public
sphere enjoying significant support from the Court, how should it balance
employee religious rights, coworker rights to be free from harassment, and
employer business interests?
In accommodating religion in the workplace, courts necessarily face a
balancing act. Courts must balance the right of employees to be free to
express their religious identities with other employees‘ right not to work in a
hostile environment and employers‘ interest in maintaining a respectful
atmosphere conducive to productivity. When faced with having to balance
competing rights and interests, judges are in the inevitable position of line
drawing. So how can courts draw lines that foster workplace norms that
include tolerating differing forms of religious expression?
By borrowing from already well-established legal doctrines, the Court can
balance these rights in a way that meaningfully accommodates respectful
religious expression while still protecting the rights of others to be free from
harassment and discrimination if that expression is not respectful of others‘
rights and identities.
This part offers three suggestions of legal tests, none of them mutually
exclusive or complete answers, to replace the current de minimis standard. 107
106. This broadening of employee protections might also come about through legislative
reform, but such a turn of events still would require courts to struggle with the appropriate standard
for balancing employee religious rights against employer prerogatives. If new laws are passed to
strengthen current accommodation laws, such as the WRFA efforts, see supra note 7, the new laws
would require courts to weigh the competing interests with a stronger emphasis on accommodating
religious expression. These new laws would surely be quickly tested in litigation, given the
balancing of interests such laws require. Thus, legislative reform would not obviate the need for
courts to revisit the question of workplace religious accommodations.
107. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986) (noting that an
employer is not required to bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating an employee‘s
religious beliefs); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985) (ruling a state
statute that provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their

20

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:1

First, as subpart A discusses, courts could borrow from workplace harassment
law to define the point at which one employee‘s religious expression begins to
infringe upon another‘s right to a nonhostile workplace; harassment law also
helpfully distinguishes between harassing conduct by supervisors and
coworkers, deeming the former to be more troubling. Second, as subpart B
discusses, courts could follow the mandate of the constitutional Establishment
Clause concepts of noncoercion and nonendorsement to define the point at
which employer accommodation of workplace religious expression begins to
infringe on the rights of workers holding different religious beliefs. Third, as
subpart C discusses, courts could look to various constitutional rights
doctrines and the Americans with Disabilities Act, which do a more balanced
job of weighing rights and costs, as a way to analyze similar issues regarding
accommodating employee religious needs.
A. Nondegradation and Anti-Harassment Models
First and foremost, employees should be afforded more freedom to
express their religious beliefs than what is reflected in the current standard in
today‘s workplace. This requires more tolerance for pluralistic religious
views by coworkers and supervisors. As American workplaces become more
diverse, it is inevitable that a growing number of workers will desire to
express themselves in religious ways in the workplace—and that workplaces
will feature others with divergent religious views. Employees may have to
work around the prayer schedules of other employees whose religious views
offend them, and the calendars employees post in their cubicles may feature
different religious quotations.108 We could try to avoid these types of
conflicts by banning such religious content (as current law and workplace
norms largely do), but in American workplaces that regularly feature quirky
and varied self-expression, it would be sheer discrimination to ban only
religious calendars; in workplaces allowing breaks for coffee, cigarettes, etc.,
it would be discrimination to disallow only prayer breaks.
In this light, much ―accommodation‖ is simply a rule of
nondiscrimination. 109 To be sure, coworker disturbances can result from
allowing such pluralism, but that was the case with the original discrimination

Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84
(1977) (holding an employer is not required to bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating
an employee‘s religious beliefs).
108. See,
e.g.,
Religious
Calendars,
http://www.calendars.com/xq/asp/PID.1/MGID.26/gAffInfo._Phrase/qx/category.htm (last visited
Nov. 10, 2008) (offering various Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, and other religious or spiritual
calendars).
109. See Jolls, supra note 76, at 231.
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laws‘ mandates that men must interact with women and that whites must
interact with blacks.
Religious diversity, like other forms of diversity, can be embraced by
employers who foster a workplace that allows employees to express their
religious beliefs fully. As Douglas A. Hicks writes, in ―constructing
respectful pluralism,‖ employers should presume inclusion. 110 Employers can
promote inclusion by encouraging a level of understanding and flexibility
amongst coworkers about diverse religious backgrounds and the
accompanying expression that stems from such identity.111
Hicks extols ―limiting norms‖ to address the potential pitfalls that can
emerge in the workplace.112 The first is a nondegradation policy prohibiting
disrespect of coworkers.113 If an expression is aimed at degrading another
(such as the anti-gay message of the employee in the Peterson case), then
such expression is not protected and should be prohibited.
Courts can evaluate coworker complaints regarding unwelcome religious
expression by borrowing from another established legal doctrine: the antiharassment framework under Title VII. In sexual harassment law, there are
two types of claims: ―quid pro quo‖ and ―hostile work environment.‖114 Quid
pro quo harassment is when a supervisor‘s sexually discriminatory behavior
―compels an employee to elect between acceding to sexual demands and
forfeiting job benefits, continued employment or promotion, or otherwise
suffering tangible job detriments.‖115 Under the EEOC guidelines, quid pro
quo sexual harassment occurs when ―submission to or rejection of
(unwelcome sexual) conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual.‖ 116 A quid pro quo religious
harassment suit would likewise analyze whether a supervisor or manager is
compelling an employee to elect between participating or attending religious

110. DOUGLAS A. HICKS, RELIGION AND THE WORKPLACE: P LURALISM, SPIRITUALITY,
LEADERSHIP 173–75 (2003); see also Debbie N. Kaminer, When Religious Expression Creates a
Hostile Work Environment: The Challenge of Balancing Competing Fundamental Rights, 4 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. P OL‘Y 81, 139–42 (2000) (encouraging an anti-harassment model in the workplace for
religious expression).
111. For a critique on the limits of Hicks‘s religious pluralism, see Achim Seifert, Respectful
Religious Pluralism in the Workplace, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & P OL‘Y J. 463 (2004) (book review).
112. HICKS, supra note 110, at 173–75.
113. Id. at 174.
114. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–23 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 63–69 (1986).
115. Christopher W. Deering, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: A Need to Reexamine the Legal Underpinnings of Title VII’s Ban on Discrimination “Because of” Sex, 27 CUMB.
L. REV. 231, 239 (1996) (quoting Highlander v. KFC Nat‘l Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir.
1986)).
116. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (2007).
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proselytizing or practices in order to continue employment or suffer negative
employment consequences.
The second harassment model that could be utilized in the religious
expression context regards hostile work environments. Hostile work
environment sexual harassment is defined by the EEOC guidelines as
―conduct [that] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual‘s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.‖117 In the well-known Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson case, the Supreme Court recognized the hostile work
environment as sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 118 The Court
adopted the language of the EEOC guidelines and found that a plaintiff could
establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment even when no tangible or
economic benefits are forfeited. 119 Specifically, the Court articulated the rule
that hostile environment claims constitute unlawful sexual harassment when
the allegedly hostile acts are ―sufficiently severe or pervasive ‗to alter the
conditions of [the victim‘s] employment and create an abusive working
environment.‘‖120
Currently, courts will recognize religious hostile work environment claims
when confronted with overtly egregious harassment. For example, in Weiss v.
United States, the employee was subjected to continuous religious slurs from
both his coworkers and supervisor.121 The religious slurs included ―such
taunts as ‗resident Jew,‘ ‗Jew faggot,‘ ‗rich Jew,‘ ‗Christ killer,‘ ‗nail him to
the cross,‘ and ‗you killed Christ, Wally, so you‘ll have to hang from the
cross.‘‖122 The court recognized the hostile work environment claim, as the
obviously demeaning and patently offensive comments constituted
―[c]ontinuous abusive language, [which] whether racist, sexist, or religious in
form, can often pollute a healthy working environment.‖ 123
Most
commentators would agree that this was not a close call given the overtly
hostile and demeaning nature of the slurs.
The true test will be the extent to which courts will recognize religious
harassment claims in cases with behavior that is less outrageous, but still goes
beyond the workplace norms of inclusiveness and respect for religious
pluralism in the workplace. For example, in a workplace that allows all forms
of idle conversation, an employee discussing her religious beliefs during

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3).
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982)).
595 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (E.D. Va. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 1056.
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breaks ordinarily would not be considered harassing. But if other employees
perceive, with reasonable basis, that the religious employee is degrading or
insulting them, or is pushing too hard for others to adopt her beliefs (such as a
fervent proselytizer who does not take ―no‖ for an answer), then the religious
speech could approach the level of actionable harassment, and an employer
would be entitled to put a halt to it before it became ―pervasive‖ enough to
amount to a violation of the harassment prohibition.
In such situations, the courts could do more to protect the expression of
religious employees than is currently allowed, while remaining mindful of the
limiting principles described here.
B. Noncoercion and Nonendorsement Models
Another limiting principle to the general acceptability of religious
expression is one of noncoercion. Workplace policies can require employers
not to use their authority (both formal and informal) over subordinates to
influence them with regard to their religious beliefs. 124 Likewise, employees
can be discouraged from imposing dogmatic views onto their coworkers. This
includes ―proselytizing‖ and other forms of coercive efforts by workers with
the aim of changing another‘s beliefs about religion. A religious supervisor
could not require an atheist or any other employee to attend prayer meetings
or be fired, although the supervisor has a religious expression right. 125
This would also include prohibiting employers from endorsing one
particular religion over others in the workplace. Much like applying the
Establishment Clause model to private employers, this limiting principle
would combat the coercive effects of an ―institutional preference for a specific
religious worldview.‖126 Courts can borrow from the Establishment Clause
model for evaluating the effects of employers‘ religious expression by using
the ―endorsement‖ test.
After the Lemon test fell out of favor, the Court began assessing
entanglement of government with religion by asking whether government
action ―constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion.‖127 Under this
test, courts can examine employers‘ religious expression by asking if the
expression endorses or disapproves of one particular religion over others. For
example, if an employer allowed employees to use a break room for all kinds

124. See id. at 1057.
125. These facts are similar to the case of EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing
Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), which instead relied upon anti-discrimination standards that ―seem
to conclude that religion has no place in the workplace.‖ Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 94, at 618–
19.
126. HICKS, supra note 110, at 179.
127. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
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of personal purposes, from baby showers to prayer meetings, then those
prayer meetings would be a reasonable accommodation, not an impermissible
―endorsement‖ of religion; as discussed above, courts have ruled exactly to
the contrary under the de minimis standard of workplace religious
accommodation,128 but courts have allowed the same sort of neutral ―open
room‖ policies in Establishment Clause cases about the use of public
property. 129 However, if an employer had a special room for Christian prayer
groups exclusively, this would violate the endorsement test because it
constitutes an endorsement of one particular religion over another. However,
if the prayer room was open for all religious denominations, including
meditation for Buddhists, prayer for Muslims, or chanting for Hindus, then the
expression would not be endorsing one religion over another and would be
acceptable religious expression.
The reason that employers‘ religious expression would be curtailed more
than employee religious expression under this test is because of the inherent
power dynamic at play in the employment relationship that so heavily favors
employers.130 Because employees are in a subservient role vis-à-vis their
employer, the employer cannot go too far in expressing one particular religion
because of the chilling effect it has on employee religious expression. If an
employer promoted its own religious views, the coercive effect of that
seeming ―endorsement‖ would prevent employees from expressing their own
religious beliefs if they diverged from their employer‘s religion. Accordingly,
courts can borrow the Establishment Clause test of ―coercion‖ for these
situations, which allows government religious expression as long as it does
not ―coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way which ‗establishes a [state] religion or religious faith,
or tends to do so.‘‖131 This test would be triggered to stop the coercive effects
associated with the power imbalance imbued in employment relationships.
However, while this test solves the power imbalance of employer religious
expression, it does not reach the problem of employee religious expression,
which would be chilled by such a restrictive test if applied to it.
With the aforementioned principles of religious pluralism in mind, courts
can encourage employers to institutionalize policies that accommodate
respectful religious expression in the workplace. Grievances (both internally
and in the courts) can be evaluated based on principles that balance workplace
128. See Berry v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006).
129. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 110 (2001) (holding
unconstitutional a public school‘s exclusion of a Christian children‘s club from after-hours use of
school facilities that ordinarily were open to groups of all kinds).
130. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1406 (1967).
131. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
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ideals, such as accommodation, equality, neutrality, tolerance, and inclusion.
These five ideals, as outlined by Steven D. Jamar, 132 would foster a workplace
that allows for religious expression without fear of coercion and intimidation.
For example, if coworkers were tolerant of the religious expressions of
their fellow employees, there could be less of the sort of conflict created in the
Wilson case.133 Whether the fetus button she wore was degrading or should be
tolerated is a content-based determination, but one which must be analyzed,
first by the employer and, if necessary, by the courts. If the workplace norms
had advanced such that workers were more regularly exposed to, and
therefore were acculturated to be more tolerant of, opposing viewpoints, the
conflict might never have inflamed to the point at which litigation became
necessary.
C. Undue Burden Test
The balancing of religious expression in the workplace requires the courts
to assess what is truly ―unduly burdensome‖ for employers to undertake to
accommodate their employees. In reevaluating what ―unduly burdensome‖
means in a pluralistic society, the Court need look only to its ―undue burden‖
jurisprudence in various fundamental constitutional rights. Analogizing
workers‘ statutory religious rights to fundamental constitutional rights makes
sense for two reasons. First, religion is given special protection under a
variety of constitutional and statutory doctrines and is especially important to
the current conservative bloc of Justices, as outlined above. Second, a
person‘s religious identity, although mutable, is a fundamental personal
decision on par with recognized fundamental rights such as marriage and
procreation and arguably more important to many people than association and
political speech.
Fundamental rights under the Constitution traditionally merit strict
scrutiny, but given that Title VII religious rights extend further than
constitutional religious rights (both by reaching into private workplaces and
by requiring accommodations against neutral workplace rules),134 it is
appropriate to use the more lenient ―undue burden‖ test applicable to
constitutional rights such as abortion that do not require restrictions to be

132. Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title VII
and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 780–89 (1996).
133. See Wilson v. U.S. West Commc‘ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995).
134. Compare, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a ―disparate
impact‖ based on race, without discriminatory intent, is insufficient to establish a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971) (holding opposite under the Title VII statutory, rather than constitutional, ban on racial
discrimination by employers).
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justified with strict scrutiny.135 Similar language—―undue hardship‖—is used
in Title VII, 136 and the lawmakers arguably used that language for a reason: to
provide substantial protection to religious workers‘ rights.137
Under an ―undue burden‖ standard, limits on religious expression would
be lawful only if such limitations were not a ―direct legal obstacle‖138 to
expressing one‘s religion, or put another way, if the limitations on religious
expression had a purpose or ―effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path.‖139 Accordingly, laws or employer policies and practices that were a
substantial obstacle to religious expression in the workplace would be struck
down.
Employers may argue that accommodating religious workers simply costs
too much. As commentator Achim Seifert has acknowledged, religious
pluralism principles are effective in the private work sphere only so long as
they are compatible with the ultimate goal of business: profit making. 140
While these principles are seemingly not inconsistent with profit seeking, the
courts are likewise sympathetic to the employer‘s interest in the productivity
lost as these interests are sorted out. 141 There are three responses to courts‘
concern about putting employers‘ profits at risk.
First, eradicating discrimination in the workplace often comes with a price
tag, but courts still mandate compliance in the interest of furthering a just
society (or at least in the interest of effectuating a clear congressional intent to
further a just society by imposing a rights mandate on businesses). For
example, in the disability context, the Americans with Disabilities Act
requires that employers comply with its provisions for equal accessibility for
disabled employees. 142 Although these provisions can cost employers
thousands, or tens of thousands, of dollars per accommodated employee, 143
135. Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
Establishing Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (1993)
(―Casey rejected the strict scrutiny standard of review mandated by Roe, adopting instead the more
permissive ‗undue burden‘ standard.‖) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000) (―The term ‗religion‘ includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee‘s or prospective employee‘s religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer‘s business.‖).
137. See Engle, supra note 10, at 387–89.
138. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 n.12 (1978) (regarding the fundamental right to
marriage).
139. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (regarding women‘s fundamental right to choose whether to have
an abortion).
140. Seifert, supra note 111, at 467.
141. See, e.g., Wilson v. U.S. West Commc‘ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341 (8th Cir. 1995).
142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12114 (2000).
143. Peter David Blanck, Transcending Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Case
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the courts have upheld this costly burden because of the justice it serves in
assuring equal access for all.
Indeed, the disabled worker is unable to work in a particular workplace if
accommodations are not made. In workplaces that fail to accommodate
religious workers, these workers are faced with a similar dilemma of lost job
opportunities because they are unwilling to abandon their religious identity
and the requirements of that identity. Even though one might point out that
disabled workers do not choose their disability, as stated above, religious
workers do not view an abandonment of their religion as a ―choice‖ able to be
made at will.
Additionally, where a requested religious accommodation is relatively
modest, courts should not hesitate to require it when the only objection is that
it would make other employees unhappy. After all, courts have never
recognized an ―upset coworker‖ exception to anti-discrimination laws, even to
accommodation mandates. Rejecting religious accommodation because
coworkers are upset is no more justified than letting coworker preferences
trump requirements of disability accommodations, medical leave, antiharassment policies, etc.
This argument against a ―coworker veto‖ does not diminish the point
made above that religious expression that is aimed at demeaning secularist
workers should not be protected or accommodated. Like prohibited hate
speech (in the constitutional context) or sexual harassment (in the statutory
context), speech and conduct that courts find violate these principles should
not be deemed acceptable (and protectable) religious expression. In this way,
content matters and, as in other content-based inquiries, courts will have to
balance the rights of religious expression with the rights of other workers to
be free from harassment.
Lastly, a proactive approach for employers to create a respectful
workplace for religious diversity is arguably good for business, as well as
good for employees. As any good motivational speaker will tell you: Happy
employees are productive employees.144 In order to keep both the religious
observer and the secularist happy, employers can promote a set of ―best
practices‖ guidelines 145 for managers and supervisors that incorporate the
values of inclusion and nondiscrimination outlined here.
Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co., 20 MENTAL & P HYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 278, 279–80
(1996) (noting that while many disability accommodations are low-cost, accommodations such as
automatic door openers (a common accommodation for wheelchair-using employees) cost over
$1000, and the cost of visual impairment accommodations (such as Braille displays and related
technologies) can exceed $20,000).
144. See, e.g., PETER R. GARBER, 99 WAYS TO KEEP EMPLOYEES HAPPY, SATISFIED,
MOTIVATED, AND P RODUCTIVE (2001).
145. See N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, Free Speech in the Workplace: Policy #193 (on file with
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However, this approach does require an expansion of what is currently
considered acceptable workplace behavior and discussion. In an expansive
and healthy workplace, workers are free to express religious views, as they do
views on traditional American topics of conversation: politics, sports, and
family, to name a few. Religious garb or prayer breaks can be met, not with
suspicion of coercion, but with the openness that accompanies culturally
acceptable identities, such as being married with children, or an animal lover,
or a rabid fan for a particular baseball team. Although a single worker might
feel devalued with prominent photographic displays of spouses and children, a
mother of six children might feel slighted by a population-control advocate,
an animal lover might be horrified by a hunting aficionado, and a Mets fan
might dislike the overbearing Yankees fan with excessive team paraphernalia,
one set of these workers does not get to control the workplace to prohibit the
other‘s expression. Likewise, secularist workers should not have the ability to
silence religiously observant workers.
Courts have the tools to balance the competing interests of employees‘
right to express their religion with employers‘ interest in productivity. By
using a true ―undue burden‖ test, instead of a de minimis standard, courts
could enforce the true legislative intent of the accommodation laws. Further,
anti-discrimination and anti-harassment laws already in place can be used to
curb the threat of coercive expression. These already familiar approaches
support the implementation of workplace norms that include respectful
religious pluralism.
Through this self-correction, the courts will be addressing three important,
converging issues identified in this Article: (1) workplaces are increasingly
sites of important expression; (2) workplaces are increasingly sites of broad
religious diversity; and (3) employers cannot expect workers to cover or sever
their religious identities at their door.
VI. CONCLUSION
With growing religious diversity in the workplace, the clear congressional
intent to support religious accommodation, and the Supreme Court‘s
increasing recognition of religion‘s role in society, it is time for courts to
refine their balancing act. It is time to move away from the Hardison position
of allowing employers to stamp out employee religious expression with only a
de minimis burden showing. Instead, courts must adhere to a new balancing
act, one which encourages employers to make a strong showing of an actual
burden if denying religious accommodation to their employees. But with this
rise of recognizing that religious observers have expressive rights, even in
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private workplaces, comes with it the inevitable task of line drawing. What
should the outcome be when religious observers express themselves
religiously but disrespectfully in workplaces, and when do the rights of
secularists become trumped or devalued?
Courts have the tools by which to balance these interests already. First,
workplace harassment law provides the framework to define the point at
which one employee‘s religious expression begins to infringe upon another‘s
right to a nonhostile workplace and distinguishes between harassing conduct
by supervisors and coworkers. Second, the constitutional Establishment
Clause concepts of noncoercion and nonendorsement help to define the point
at which employer accommodation of workplace religious expression begins
to infringe on the rights of workers holding different religious beliefs. Third,
courts should look to various constitutional rights doctrines and the
Americans with Disabilities Act to analyze the careful balancing of the costs
and rights associated with accommodating employee religious needs.
This new perspective results in a commingling of two important concepts:
first, fostering respectful religious pluralism and freedom of religious
expression; second, strengthening accommodation rights to allow antidiscrimination laws to be fully realized. Because the law protects religious
expression and accommodates religious observers, the presumption should
favor the worker‘s religious expression unless it demeans or devalues another
worker‘s beliefs. Balancing of interests is nothing new; giving true
accommodation to religious workers is. The test should be one of fair
balancing, not a strong presumption that employers and coworkers need not
bear any inconvenience at all. This self-correction harkens back to the
original intent of the First Amendment, as well as the congressional intent of
Title VII.

